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Two (or Five, or Ten) Heads are Better
than One: The Need for an Integrated
Effort
to
International
Election
Monitoring

ABSTRACT

Election monitoring efforts have a crucial role to play in
attaining the goals of self-determination and democratic
sovereignty. Yet current election monitoring practice suffers
from variance in the goals, standards, and strategies employed
by the many organizations that engage in election monitoring
and observation programs. This Note examines the current
state of election monitoring within the framework for analyzing
the legitimacy of rules proposed by Thomas Franck in his 1992
article The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, and
concludes that the shortcomings of the current system fail to
address many necessary aspects of legitimate self-governance of
monitored nations. The Author advocates an integrated and
coordinated approach between monitoring organizations and
effective and appropriateuse of developing technological tools in
order to improve the ability of election monitoring to aid in
attaining the goal of self-determination.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The recent elections in Iraq and Afghanistan, the highly
publicized election cycle in Ukraine, and the spectacle of the 2000
U.S. presidential election have brought questions of electoral fairness
and democratic legitimacy to the highest level of visibility in popular

20061

ELECTION MONITORING: A CALL FOR AN INTEGRA TED APPROACH

1375

culture since the wave of democratization in developing nations in the
late 1980s. Media focus on these elections predictably centers on
whether the outcomes of the elections were fair and whether they
reflected the "will of the people." Given our history of strong electoral
democracy, it is not surprising that the U.S. bias on elections is to
demand such standards. Not all nations, however, can be expected to
understand this bias, much less produce election results in
accordance with it.
A number of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have developed and
published guidelines for the evaluation of election fairness. Too much
is expected from these guidelines, however.
Most monitoring
organizations formulate a method of evaluation based on general
standards geared to determine whether or not a particular election
was "free and fair,"' or whether the result truly reflected the "will of
the people."'2 These monitoring organizations come in many shapes
and sizes and differ in their biases, goals, strategies, and
methodologies. This Note will analyze the current state of election
monitoring under this panoply of monitoring organizations, including
both its benefits and its downfalls, and will offer a proposal by which
election monitoring can improve both its efficiency and effectiveness
at meeting goals.
Part II of this Note examines the historical development of
election monitoring and the evolution of monitoring as a vital tool in
attaining democratic sovereignty. Part III analyzes the major actors
involved in monitoring activities in terms of their legal bases, goals,
and techniques. Part IV introduces Thomas Franck's theory on the
right of self-determination and his framework of four indicators
required for strong rules. It also details the shortcomings of the
current state of election monitoring viewed in light of Franck's
framework and explains how these shortfalls interfere with the goals
of achieving democratic sovereign legitimacy. Finally, Part V offers a
proposal for the future of election monitoring which addresses the
downfalls of the current system and better focuses monitoring
activities on attaining the underlying goal of democratic legitimacy.

1.
See, e.g., Inter-Am. C.H.R., Inter-American Democratic Charter art. 3, Sept.
11, 2001, available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/ democratic.htm [hereinafter InterAmerican]; Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation art. 3, Oct.
27, 2005, available at http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2231.pdf [hereinafter
Declaration of Principles]; THEODOR HANF ET AL., OBSERVING DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS:

A EUROPEAN APPROACH 4 (1995); United Nations Electoral Assistance: Main Types of
Assistance, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/eadeacontent/ea-types of assist.htm (last
visited Sept. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Electoral Assistance].
2.
See, e.g., ERIC C. BJORNLUND, BEYOND FREE AND FAIR: MONITORING
ELECTIONS AND BUILDING DEMOCRACY 118-21 (2004).

[VOL. 39:1373

VANDERBIL T]OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

II. ORIGINS AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ELECTION
MONITORING SYSTEM

Election monitoring organizations and missions have gradually
developed since the first election observations occurred in the early
twentieth century. As election monitoring has become more common,
the techniques and uses have become more thorough and polished.
Various actors have monitored elections throughout the world for
many years. The earliest election monitors were trusteeship nations,
who observed and maintained some control over their colonies prior
to the colonies' obtaining independence. 3 These early observations
gave rise to the first rules and guidelines for judging electoral
processes and outcomes. 4 The missions were usually performed by
trustee nations, often with the aid of United Nations (U.N.) teams. 5
At the end of the colonial era, the most difficult transitions to
independence gave the U.N. its first opportunity to engage in more
comprehensive election monitoring. 6 The U.N. continued to be
involved in transition elections for many years, and in 1989 and 1990
7
it began monitoring the elections of independent member states.
In 1989, election observation began to develop into its current
form with the U.N.'s monitoring of the Namibian elections for
independence in November; this was the first comprehensive
monitoring mission in the world's history.8 The following year, the
U.N. monitored elections in its own member states for the first time:
in Nicaragua in February and Haiti in December. 9 By the mid-to-late
1990s, monitoring had become so common that hardly an election
occurred without involvement by some type of monitoring
organization. 10
One of the most important developments in election monitoring
was the realization that effective missions require involvement
throughout the entire election process: from pre-election preparation,
to election day, and throughout the post-election period.11 Many
early missions focused heavily on election day itself, ignoring the

3.
J. INT'L L.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
American

Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to DemocraticGovernance, 86 AM.
46, 69 (1992).
Id. at 70.
See, e.g., id. at 69-70.
Id. at 70-71.
Id.; see also BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 54-56.
Jennifer McCoy, Monitoring and Mediating Elections during Latin
Democratization,

in

ELECTORAL

OBSERVATION

AND

DEMOCRATIC

TRANSITIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 53, 57 (Kevin J. Middlebrook ed., 1998).
9.
Id. at 58.
10.
Id. at 59-60.
11.
Santiago A. Canton & Neil Nevitte, Domestic Electoral Observation: The
Practical Lessons, in ELECTORAL OBSERVATION AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN
LATIN AMERICA, supra note 8, at 39-41.
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importance of pre-election activities, such as voter registration and
education, campaign publicity, and media coverage. 12 Post-election
fallout, such as further media coverage and responses of elected
officials, was also ignored. 13 Maintaining a presence throughout all
three stages of the process is crucial to a mission's success and must
14
be incorporated into the formation of serious monitoring goals.
Technological developments have also aided the evolution of
election monitoring, 15 with the most important advance probably
being the parallel counting mechanism or "quick count." The quick
count was first used in the Carter Center's Panama mission in 1989
and has revolutionized the effectiveness of monitoring missions in
subsequent elections. 16
It provides a way for independent
organizations to check the accuracy of official vote results and to
determine and have access to those independent results almost
immediately following the close of the polls. 17
As technology
continues to advance, quick count techniques will become even more
18
accurate and quickly available.
Since the initial introduction of the quick count, technology has
advanced in leaps and bounds. Perhaps surprisingly, less-developed
nations' use of election monitoring technology has been far ahead of
their European and North American counterparts. 19 For example,
electronic voter registration systems and computerized voting
machines are already widespread in many Latin American and
former Soviet Bloc nations. 20 A considerable number of those nations
also use high-tech satellite transmission systems to obtain nearly
instantaneous and accurate reporting of election day activities and
21
results.

III. MAJOR ACTORS IN ELECTION MONITORING
At present, the organizations that participate in election
observation activities can be divided into five general categories: the
U.N., regional IGOs, NGOs, domestic organizations within target

12.

BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 129-31, 139-49.

13.
Id. at 144-46.
14.
Id. at 130.
15.
Middlebrook, supra note 8, at 41-42 (discussing technological developments
in election monitoring); see also BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 280-81.
16.
BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 76.
17.
See Middlebrook, supra note 8, at 41-42 (discussing "quick count"
techniques).
18.
Canton & Nevitte, supra note 11, at 41.
19.
Julia A. Glidden, Election Monitoring, Technology and the Promotion of
Democracy:A Case for InternationalStandards, 19 WIS. INT'L L.J. 353, 358-61 (2001).
20.
Id. at 359-60.
21.
Id. at 360.
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countries, and national organizations from states other than those
targeted. The level,, nature, and expertise of involvement vary among
the categories, as does the definition of free and fair used to evaluate
the outcome.
A. The United Nations
The primary U.N. subdivision involved in election monitoring is
the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD), which was specially created
for the purpose of observing and evaluating elections. 22 The EAD was
first created as the Electoral Assistance Unit by the General
Assembly in 1991, and roots its authority in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights -and the International Covenant on
23
Civil and Political Rights.
The U.N. limits its involvement to only those elections that meet
a specific set of conditions.2 4 These prerequisites reflect the U.N.'s
concern with the sovereignty of its member nations. 25 While this
policy consciously defers to individual nations' sovereignty and
ensures that U.N. resources are best spent in those countries
determined to be most qualified, it also prevents the U.N. from being
involved in a number of elections that are arguably in greatest need
of improving their democratic legitimacy. For example, authoritarian
governments intent on holding non-transparent elections to maintain
their power monopolies have no reason to approach the U.N. to
request election assistance or observation. The U.N. is also actively
involved in monitoring when elections take place during its
comprehensive peacekeeping missions in emerging or transitioning
26
states.

22.
G.A. Res. 46/137, T 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/137 (Dec. 17, 1991).
23.
Id.
2-3 (underscoring "the significance of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
establish that the authority to govern shall be based on the will of the people, as
expressed in genuine and periodic elections" and further stressing "its conviction that
periodic and genuine elections are a necessary and indispensable element of sustained
efforts to protect the rights and interests of the governed"); United Nations Electoral
Assistance: Context and Objectives, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/eadlea-content/ea_
context.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Context and Objectives].
24.
United Nations Electoral Assistance: Preconditions for Assistance,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/ea_content /ea.preconditions.htm (last visited Sept.
22, 2006).
25.
U.N. activities in the field of electoral assistance are conducted in
conformity with the basic principles of the sovereign equality of states and respect for
their territorial integrity and political independence, as enunciated in the UN Charter.
Assistance activities are carried out only where requested by national authorities of
Member States and broadly supported by the people of the country concerned. See
Context and Objectives, supra note 23.
26.
BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 54.
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Generally, the U.N.'s authority and goals for election
involvement stem from other programs in place to guarantee human
rights, since human rights are often necessary for legitimate
democratic systems to exist. 27 As a result, the EAD tends to limit its
involvement to transitioning states, or those in which there are
28
obvious disputes over power monopolies or human rights abuses.
Consequently, the U.N. is not involved in some elections where there
is an almost universal suspicion of illegitimate campaign tactics and
abuse of power. Governments of those states often do not request the
U.N.'s presence for the same reasons that abuses of power exist in the
29
first place.
The U.N. often plays only a minimal role in elections that are
part of peacekeeping missions or government transitions conducted
by non-U.N. entities. 30 In such cases, elections typically proceed
under the tight control of the nations or organizations in control of
the mission, which sometimes have an obvious stake in electoral
outcomes. 31 For example, the post-conflict elections in Iraq and
Afghanistan were conducted in the context of U.S. occupation of both
countries. Since the U.S. had an obvious stake in the outcome of the
election, its presence likely heavily influenced them. 32 Had these
elections been part of a larger U.N.-led mission, the U.N. may have
played a greater monitoring role. The absence of the U.N. or other
multilateral organizations arguably negatively affected the legitimacy
33
of those elections.
B. Regional Inter-Governmental Organizations
A number of regional IGOs also play an active role in election
observation in their own regions. The most active of these are the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the
Organization of American States (OAS). 34 The European Union is
also heavily involved in many elections.3 5 The African Union and the
Asia Foundation are involved in their member states' election

27.
28.

Id. at 57.
Id. at 57-58.

29.
See, e.g., id. at 59-60.
30.
See, e.g., Iraq Electoral Fact Sheet, http://www.un.org/news/dh/infocus/iraq/
election-fact-sht.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2006) (stating that the U.N. had no
supervisory role in the Iraqi elections but only provided limited support).
31.
See Phyllis Bennis, Iraqi Elections, ZNET, Dec. 20, 2004, http://www.zmag.
org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID= 6899.
32.
See id. (predicting strong U.S. influence over Iraqi election results).
33.
See id. (comparing and contrasting the U.S. occupation of Iraq to the U.N.monitored elections in East Timor in 1999).
34.
BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 63.
35.
Id.
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processes, but neither has developed as stringent a set of guidelines
36
as their European and American counterparts.
In contrast to the U.N.'s deference to requests for assistance
from target nations, regional organizations are generally more
proactive in their decisions to monitor elections within their regional
jurisdictions. 37 Most regional IGOs do not require the target country
to request their presence and involvement. 38 In some cases, some
form of election monitoring is mandated by the organizations'
39
founding documents.
Most IGOs establish their authority for monitoring in their
founding documents 40 as well as in universal agreements on human
rights issues. 41 It is important to keep in mind that these regional
organizations have a particular stake in the elections taking place
within their region. 42 All regional IGOs state the existence of true
democratic governance as a pre-requisite to membership. 43 Effective
functioning of such organizations therefore relies on the truly
democratic nature of their member countries. This creates an
unavoidable bias toward finding legitimacy in election outcomes.
Furthermore, regional IGOs often also are involved in other electionrelated programs, such as voter education, get-out-the-vote drives,
44
and campaigns to deter violence and intimidation at the polls.
Because they are more than merely observers or providers of objective
technical assistance, regional IGOs may manifest a concrete interest
in the outcome of the elections they monitor.
Many regional organizations use similar techniques for
monitoring, but it is important to note a few key differences in their
observation methods and processes.
1.

The Organization of American States

The OAS is the most comprehensive and engaged of any regional
organization. It developed as a major player around the same time

36.
See African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic
Elections in Africa, AHG/Decl.1 (XXXVIII) (2002) [hereinafter African Union],
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/compilationidemocracy/ahg.htm;
The
Asia Foundation, Governance, Law, and Civil Society: Elections, http://www.
asiafoundation.orgGovernance/elections.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2006) [hereinafter
Asia Foundation Elections].
37.
See, e.g., Inter-American, supra note 1, art. 18; HANF ET AL., supra note 1,
at 98; Electoral Assistance, supra note 1.
38.
See United Nations Electoral Assistance, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/
ead-main-page.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
39.
See id.
40.
See id.
41.
See id.
42.
See id.
43.
See id.; see also BJORNLUND, supranote 2, at 59-60.
44.
See, e.g., Asia Foundation Elections, supranote 36.
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that monitoring was embraced as an important tool for ensuring
democratic governance. 4 5 Not coincidentally, the democratic wave of
the 1980s had perhaps its strongest impact on Central and South
American nations. 46 Before the democratic wave of 1989, the OAS's
role as an election monitor was more or less to show moral support for
democratic elections. 47 As the member nations of the OAS began to
develop higher standards for legitimate democracy, the organization
took a more active role and formed more comprehensive standards for
48
the evaluation of election processes.
The Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001 requires "free
and fair elections" as a prerequisite for membership, as well as
' 49
"transparency" and "accountability of governmental institutions."
Stating that "the effective exercise of representative democracy is the
basis for the rule of law and of the constitutional regimes of [its]
member states,"50 the Charter lists "the holding of periodic, free, and
fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage" as a
requirement for such a representative democracy. 51 The OAS
observes elections only in its member states. Missions are led by the
Department of Democratic and Political Affairs (DDPA), which
evaluates elections against the constitutions and laws of target
states. 52 The DDPA's main activities are to observe and report on
election processes, 5 3 both of which are conducted by large groups of
observers who are present throughout the election process, from
54
registration through tallying and verifying of results.
2.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The OSCE rose to its prime in the wake of the fall of the Soviet
Union and its involvement in transitional elections in Eastern and
Central Europe. 55 The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR) is the umbrella organization under which OSCE
election missions take place. 56 The purpose of the ODIHR is two-fold:
to evaluate elections based on OSCE standards and to offer "proactive

45.
46.

BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 21.
Id.

47.
48.
49.
50.

McCoy, supra note 8, at 57.
Id. at 58-59.
Inter-American, supra note 1, arts. 3-4; BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 63.
Inter-American, supra note 1, art. 2.

51.

Id. art. 3.

52.
Secretariat for Political Affairs, Electoral Observation Missions,
http://www.sap.oas.org/opd/electoral/default.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.

BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 63.

56.
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights-Elections,
Overview, http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/13748.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
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and constructive input" and assistance to target nations to better
attain those standards in the future. 57 The ODIHR draws its legal
mandate for election monitoring from various international treaties
on principles of human rights and democratic governance. 58 The
ODIHR uses OSCE-formulated guidelines, rather than standards set
by domestic law, to evaluate election procedures" 9 and analyze
60
election laws of the target nations.
The ODIHR prioritizes elections to best conserve and allocate
their limited resources. 61
Rather than demanding baseline
guarantees and democratic freedom as do other organizations, it
specifically focuses its attention on those nations most in need of
monitoring and
democratic
support:
new and developing
democracies. 62 The ODIHR identifies certain guarantees that it
requests from the governments of target nations for election
observation to be truly effective. 63 It also sends smaller, short-term
''assessment missions" to play a more limited role in elections in more
established democracies. 64 In some cases, the ODIHR also sends
small "expert missions" when full-scale monitoring missions are not
65
feasible.
3.

The Organization of African Unity

In 2002, the General Assembly of the African Union released an
official statement on the importance of democratic elections in
Africa. 66 It stated that democratic elections are "the basis of the
authority of any representative government" and "constitute a key
element of the democratization process and therefore, are essential
ingredients for good governance, the rule of law, the maintenance and
promotion of peace, security, stability and development., 67 The
resolution requests that the OAU become more involved in
monitoring the elections of its member states. 68 Monitoring is
coordinated by the General Secretariat and governed by guidelines
created for each particular mission in accordance with the internal

57.
Id.
58.
See, e.g., Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the
Human Dimension of the CSCE, art. 8 (June 29, 1990) [hereinafter Copenhagen],
available at http://www.osce.org/documentsodihr/1990/06/13992_en.pdf#search=Document.
59.
ORG. FOR SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR. OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INST. &
HUMAN RIGHTS, ELECTION OBSERVATION HANDBOOK (5th ed. 2005).

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 21.

64.

Id. at 14.

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
African Union, supra note 36.
Id.
Id.
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laws of the target nation.6 9 The OAU requires invitations to elections
to be sent by member states at least two months in advance and
reserves the right to decline involvement when target nations do not
meet specified criteria. 70 This filter creates similar problems to those
encountered by other organizations that also impose prerequisites for
monitoring.
4.

The Asia Foundation

The Asia Foundation does not directly provide election
monitoring missions, but rather it supports monitoring activities of
both local and international NGOs in its member countries. 71 The
Asia Foundation's involvement mainly provides financial resources
for various election programs. 72 Assistance is not specifically directed
at monitoring activities but rather is distributed generally to
organizations at all levels of democracy-building. 73 In other words,
the Asia Foundation does not treat monitoring as a distinct part of
74
the process of ensuring democratic legitimacy.
5.

The European Union

The EU takes a slightly different approach to election
monitoring. The EU's Election Assistance & Observation Division
(EAOD) focuses on assisting nations outside the reach of the OSCE's
activities, specifically African and South American countries with
particularly volatile political climates. 75 South Africa, Mozambique,
and Palestine are three of the most self-touted examples of EU
involvement, although it is often involved in efforts closer to home as
well, such as in Russia, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 76 The
EAOD functions more like an NGO, except with additional legitimacy
gleaned from the EU's character as a strong IGO. The EAOD has two
tiers of involvement in elections: observation and assistance. 77 It
applies different standards to determine whether to engage in one or

69.
Id.
70.
Id. (discussing UN standards for entering monitoring missions).
71.
The Asia Foundation, Bangladesh: Overview, http://www.asiafoundation.
orgfblocationslbangladesh.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
72.
Asia Foundation Elections, supra note 36.
73.

Id.

74.
Id.
75.
BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 66; The EU's Human Rights and
Democratisation Policy: EU Election Assistance & Observation, http://europa.eu.int/
commlexternal relations/humanrights/eu-election ass observ/ (last visited Sept. 22,
2006).
76.

Communication from

the

Commission on

EU Election Assistance and

Observation, COM(2000) 191 final, at 26-27 (Apr. 4, 2000), availableat http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com2000/com2000_0191en01.pdf [hereinafter Communication].
77.
Id. at 15.
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the other activity. 78 Historically, the EAOD has been most actively
involved through its provision of technical and financial assistance,
79
but it also has sent observers to directly monitor a few elections.
The EAOD's guidelines are detailed and complex, yet there is little
80
evidence that it has successfully obtained its goals.
Like the U.N., the EU hesitates to involve itself in elections
where certain basic thresholds of democratic governance are not
met. 8 ' EU participation must be advisable, viable, and useful under
the 1998 EU Council Criteria on whether to send an EU observation
mission.8 2 Thus, the EU suffers from problems similar to those that
confront the U.N., i.e., being forced to abstain from monitoring those
83
elections most in need of assistance.
C. The InternationalInstitute for Democracy and ElectoralAssistance
Another international IGO deeply involved in elections
throughout the world is the International Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Unlike the OAS and the OSCE,
IDEA's membership is not region-specific, and it was created
specifically to work toward election fairness. 8 4 IDEA focuses on
election processes, rather than concerning itself with other aspects of
development or human rights. 85 It views itself as countering the
influence of U.S. organizations and other powerful nations in election
monitoring.86 IDEA does not actually participate in any hands-on
election monitoring, but rather it has simply formulated a detailed
set of standards under which it argues that elections should be
analyzed to determine if they were free and fair.8 7 IDEA's standards
are probably the most detailed, technical, and best articulated of any
organizations.8 8 However, theirs are also the loftiest goals and in the
context of many less-developed nations, appear at least on their face
simply to be unobtainable.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
missions).
84.
85.
members).
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 16-19.
BJORNLUND, supra note 32, at 66.
Communication, supra note 76, at 35-42.
Id. at 16-17, 35.
Id. at 17-18.
See supra Part II.A (discussion on the U.N.'s decisions to enter monitoring
BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 66-67.
Id. at 66 (stating that no UN Security Council members are IDEA
Id.
Id. at 66-67.
Compare IDEA with the OAS, UN, OSCE, and Carter Center standards.
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D. NGOs
The best known and highest reputed election monitoring NGO is
tY
F Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia. 89 The Carter Center, led by
)rmer President Jimmy Carter, has established itself as a powerful
and perhaps even vital ingredient to the legitimacy of elections
throughout the world.9 0 In addition to being a leader in developing
election monitoring technology and effective publicity campaigns, 9 1
Carter Center programs focus on ensuring other basic human and
democratic rights necessary for democratic governance. 92 These
include programs to improve relations and communication between
sectors of domestic society, programs focused on fairness in judicial
branches, and other supervisory and monitoring programs to
eliminate human rights abuses. 93 In this regard, the Carter Center
understands and promotes the relationship between election fairness
and other basic human rights guarantees, unlike those organizations
that demand other guarantees before agreeing to engage in
monitoring. 94 There are also a number of other U.S.-based groups
such as the traditionally Republican-affiliated
International
Republican Institute (IRI), the traditionally Democrat-affiliated
National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International
95
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES).
NGOs have less of a stake in election outcomes than some other
monitoring organizations. Each has a stake in its own reputation as a
neutral observer and important force in global democratic
development, but the concerns of the U.N. and IGOs in legitimizing
their own identities are not present for these groups. In addition,
many NGOs have fewer political constraints than IGOs, allowing
them to be more openly critical in many circumstances. 96
Furthermore, the structures of these organizations tend to be smaller
and less bureaucratic, allowing them to respond more rapidly and
97
effectively to last minute changes and needs.

89.
BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 74-94.
90.
Id.
91.
Id. at 74-94 (discussing the quick count, and Carter's early success in
publicizing results).
92.
Promoting Democracy, Election Monitoring, http://www.cartercenter.org/
peaceprograms/programlO.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2006).
93.
Id.
94.
See supra Part I11A, B.5 (discussing EU and U.N. monitoring decisions).
95.
BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 67. For ease of analysis, this Note's focus will
remain on the characteristics of those NGOs with the most thorough and universal
reach.
96.
Middlebrook, supra note 11, at 35; see also TIMOTHY C. EVERED, UNITED
NATIONS ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE AND THE EVOLVING
GOVERNANCE 44 (1996).
97.
See, e.g., BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 77-78.
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However, NGOs have less power to compel compliance or enforce
their recommendations in target states, since they lack the
international legal basis possessed by both the U.N. and regional
organizations. 98 Another cause for concern is that such organizations
often receive funding from individual nations 99or private sources that
may have a bias or stake in election outcomes.
E. Domestic Organizationswithin Target States
Domestic monitoring organizations vary dramatically in the size,
nature, and thoroughness of their involvement.10 0 These groups tend
to be the best equipped with on-the-ground information and resources
due to their composition of primarily in-state actors. 10 1 Domestic
groups often collaborate or receive assistance from NGOs or IGOs but
typically retain their independent identity and the implications for
102
legitimacy that follow from it.
Such groups also have an obvious stake in the outcome of the
elections they observe, as they are normally composed of citizens and
institutions from within the target states themselves. 103 They are
invested in obtaining legitimate election results yet do not necessarily
have as strong a bias in favor of decreeing democratic legitimacy as
do regional groups. However, because they are from within the target
country, they do not enjoy the same force of international authority as
do other monitoring organizations. Yet they are more directly in
touch with the circumstances of target nations and thus have an
advantage in evaluating whether election observation standards are
reasonable or helpful for the particular situation at hand. They are
also less susceptible to the perception of being "outsiders."
F. National Organizationsfrom States Other Than Those Targeted
Many elections are monitored by groups or missions sponsored
by other sovereign nations. This practice is especially common in the
context of peacekeeping or other more comprehensive development
The most obvious examples of such monitoring are
missions.
circumstances like the recent elections in Afghanistan and Iraq. In
both nations' elections, the United States helped coordinate and

The exception to this in many cases is the involvement of the Carter
98.
Center. Former President Carter's prominent role and credibility as a former world
leader has almost single-handedly resolved a number of electoral conflicts. See
generally BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 74-93.
See EVERED, supra note 96, at 44.
99.
100.
See Middlebrook, supra note 8, at 42-46.
101.
Id. at 35.
102.
Id.
Id.
103.
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monitor domestic elections while also maintaining its military
occupation force in the region. 10 4 Such missions should be easy to
coordinate, since the monitoring country is familiar with the target
nation and often can rely on pre-existing knowledge and tools about
the target nation.' 0 5 However, allegations of bias often plague these
as a
missions. 10 6 Bias in the election missions is sometimes perceived
10 7
continuation of the apparent bias in the overall occupations.

IV. ELECTION MONITORING STANDARDS AGAINST THEIR
THEORETICAL BACKDROP

A. The InternationalLegal Right to Self-Governance
and Self-Determination
The rights to self-governance and self-determination form the
theoretical basis for many election monitoring missions, and thus it is
helpful to understand these concepts in order to comprehend the
goals and operations of such endeavors. Self-governance is more than
merely an academic theory. It is a right firmly established in
of international
founding documents
treaties,
multilateral
organizations, and domestic constitutions, and is generally recognized
as a binding obligation under customary international law.' 0 8 Article
21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights most cohesively
describes the right to self-governance:
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public services in his
country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
109
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

All organizations dedicated to election observation formulate
some set of rules under which to evaluate election processes and

104.

See, e.g., Bennis, supranote 31.

See, e.g., U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
105.
COMMITTEES, REBUILDING IRAQ: U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR THE JANUARY 2005 ELECTIONS
2

(2005), available at: http://www.gao.govlnew.itemsldO5932r.pdf#search=%22U.S.% 0
involvement%20Iraqi%20election%22 (basing suggestions for effective assistance on
knowledge gained from U.S. agencies, U.N. agencies, and others with on.the-ground
knowledge and experience of the status in Iraq).
See, e.g., Bennis, supra note 31.
106.
107.

Id.

See EVERED, supra note 96, at 45; Gregory H. Fox, Election Monitoring: The
108.
InternationalLegal Setting, 19 WIS. INT'L L.J. 295, 297-99 (2001).
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
109.
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results. In general, such rules aim toward achieving "free and fair
elections." 110 According to the mission statements of many election
monitoring organizations, such elections are necessary for selfgovernance to be achieved. 1 ' The free and fair standard is typically
supported by the assertion of its potential assurance of concrete
political legitimacy and the idea that elections must reflect the true
"will of the people" if self-determination is to be reached. 112
The free and fair standard began to develop as the right to selfdetermination became recognized as one of the human rights
guaranteed by customary international law. 113
The key scholarly
analysis developing this theory is that of Thomas Franck, in his 1992
article The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance.114 Franck
details the development of the self-determination requirement for
nations wishing to achieve legitimacy in the international
community. 1 15 He also identifies both the right to free expression and
to electoral participation as stemming from the notion of selfdetermination, and his thesis views all three rights as inextricably
116
linked and fundamental to the self-determination goal.
According to Franck, self-determination cannot be achieved
without clearly understandable rules to define and guide nations
toward it. 11 7 Franck sets out a framework under which to analyze
the legitimacy of rules by looking at four factors of each rule:
pedigree, determinacy, coherence, and adherence. 118 The following
section analyzes the current state of election monitoring within the
framework of Franck's four indicators of the legitimacy of rules. 119
B. Election Monitoring Standardswithin Franck'sFramework for
Legitimacy of Self-Determination Rules
1.

Pedigree

Pedigree refers to a rule's basis in a historical process and the
strength it draws from its historical development. 120 The pedigree of

110.

Lara R. Corchado, Note, Complying with InternationalLaw: A Call for Free

and Fair Elections, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1029, 1044-51 (2005); see also BJORNLUND,

supra note 2, at 95 (discussing international norms and customs that must be taken
into account in evaluating legitimacy of free and fair elections).
111.
See, e.g., Inter-American, supra note 1, art. 3; Declaration of Principles,
supra note 1, art. 3; HANF ET AL., supra note 1, at 4; Electoral Assistance, supra note 1.
112.
Corchado, supra note 110, at 1064.
113.
Id. at 1045 (citing Franck, supra note 3).
114.
Franck, supra note 3.
115.
Id. at 52-56.
116.
Id. at 52.
117.
Id. at 51.
118.

Id.

119.
120.

Id.
Id.
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rules for self-determination comes at least in part, Franck argues,
from the historical circumstances through which international
concern over domestic democratic activities arose and evolved. 121 A
large part of that historical development occurred through the
122
introduction and maintenance of election observers.
This Note has briefly detailed the historical development of
election monitoring and its standards. 123 Primarily, the pedigree of
election monitoring rules comes from the growing understanding of
the importance of democratic governance and the general acceptance
of democracy as the most acceptable, if not the only acceptable, form
of government in the modern era. 124
Each of the different
organizations involved in modern election monitoring draws on
different aspects of self-determination norms, given their different
purposes and historical bases.
2.

Determinacy

Determinacy measures how well a rule communicates its
content. 125 Rules are significantly more difficult to obey when they
lack sufficient clarity of language or judicial interpretation. 1 26 The
12 7
more transparent a rule's meaning, the easier it compels behavior.
International election monitoring currently suffers from a lack of
determinacy, mainly due to the panoply of varying standards
proposed by the different organizations involved. 1 28 Not only are
target elections being evaluated against often unattainable free and
fair standards, but in each case, they are also evaluated against a
number of such standards, proposed by a number of different
organizations, which may result in a confusing amalgamation of
expectations. 12 9 In addition, many free and fair standards are framed
1 30
in vague terms that give little guidance without interpretation.
3.

Coherence

Coherence measures a rule's internal consistency, as well as its
consistency with other norms related to the rule. 13 1 Franck's idea of

121.
Id. at 52.
122.
Id.
123.
See supra Part II (discussing the evolution and history of election
monitoring).
124.

See Fox, supra note 108, at 295.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Franck, supra note 3, at 51.
Id. at 56.
Id.
See supra Part III (discussing the various organizations' standards).
Franck, supra note 3, at 56.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 51.
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coherence most clearly demonstrates the connection of election
monitoring standards and the free and fair standard to the rights of
free expression and other basic rights.132 Such rights are highly
valued and arise from a number of international treaties on human
and democratic rights, some with fairly developed enforcement
mechanisms. 133 A rule that is closely connected to these highly
134
valued documents and institutions is more compelling.
Obviously, the multiple varying standards against which to
measure election results presents a large obstacle to obtaining a
coherent set of rules against which to measure the success of
elections.
Another obstacle to coherence of election monitoring
standards is that the goals of democratic elections are necessarily
intertwined with other human and democratic rights.
Some
organizations neglect this relationship, while others put too much
emphasis on it. 1 35 Both approaches threaten the effectiveness of
election monitoring as a tool for assisting the creation of selfdetermining democracies.
a.

Blind Eye to the Dependency on other Basic Rights

Under most election monitoring standards, framing the
requirement as one of free and fair assumes that other human rights,
such as "freedoms of expression, thought, assembly, and association"
already exist within the target country. 136 The OSCE recognizes the
importance of the relationship between these rights and successful
election monitoring and specifies the necessary guarantees in the
1998 Copenhagen Document. 13 7 The Document names such votingrelated rights as universal and equal suffrage, 138 freedom of
organization and assembly, legal guarantees protecting political
parties and organizations, 139 separation between the state and
political parties, 140 assurance of the lack of discrimination or
141
intimidation for individuals and groups expressing political views,
and equal access to the media. 142 It also emphasizes other basic
human and democratic rights such as non-discrimination and equal
143
protection under the law.

132.

See id.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Corchado, supra note 110, at 1046-51.
Franck, supra note 3, at 77.
Id. at 79.
Corchado, supra note 110, at 1045-46; see also EVERED, supra note 96, at 6.
Copenhagen, supra note 58, art. 7.3.
Id.
Id. arts. 7.6, 10.3, 10.4.
Id. art. 5.4.
Id. art. 7.7.
Id. art. 7.8.
Id. art. 5.9.
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Given that truly free and fair democratic elections rely on these
other rights, monitoring that demands very high standards serves
little purpose in nations that do not guarantee them. True analysis
under these standards leads to a foregone conclusion, since elections
will necessarily fall short of the free and fair standards when basic
democratic rights are not present. A more helpful system of election
monitoring must recognize and address the lack of other democratic
guarantees in target nations and also strive for more reasonable
standards when the ideal of free and fair elections is not possible.
b.

Recognizing When Higher Pressure is Necessary

The reverse problem also surfaces in many cases. Rather than
recognizing and drawing attention to the nonexistence of such rights
in certain countries, many monitoring organizations simply refuse to
become involved in elections where these basic guarantees are
lacking or where the target nation does not request their presence in
some fashion. 144 Such absences can be just as harmful as insisting
upon unattainable goals. Monitoring can effectively identify where
such basic rights are not present and analyze how this absence affects
election outcomes. This notion is especially true now that many
monitoring organizations are present throughout all three stages of
the election process. Extended presence allows insight through the
pre- and post-election stages into other aspects of self-determination,
such as freedom of expression via media coverage and freedom of
assembly.
To wait on a request from the target nation effectively insulates
many elections where monitoring is most needed, such as where
parties or officials clearly usurp power by allowing only themselves to
be placed on the ballot 145 or by fraudulently tampering with election
counts or results. 146 When monitoring organizations fail to identify
these practices, they lose the opportunity to hold such persons
accountable in the eyes of their own citizens and the global
community.
Naturally, sovereignty concerns are one reason
monitoring organizations decline involvement without some request
or invitation. 147 Furthermore, limited funding and resources may
discourage involvement in elections perceived as lost causes.
However, election monitoring is continuously developing into a

144.
See supra Part III.A, B.5 (discussing EU and U.N. monitoring decisions).
145.
For example, the PRI's long reign in Mexico.
146.
For example, the initial allegations concerning the outcome of the 2004
elections in Ukraine.
147.
For a discussion of the effects of international election monitoring on
national sovereignty, see ARTURO SANTA CRUZ, INTERNATIONAL ELECTION
MONITORING, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IDEA: THE EMERGENCE OF
AN INTERNATIONAL NORM (2005).
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recognized and independent part of the formation of democratic
sovereign legitimacy. 148 Some involvement in even these lost-cause
elections may at least draw the global community's attention to
problematic situations.
4. Adherence
A rule's adherence is its place within a larger normative
hierarchy of rules and objectives. 149 Placement within a larger
system of norms and rules helps to ensure compliance with the rule
at issue.' 50 The standard of free and fair elections is best understood
within the higher principle of self-determination. Thus, adherence
should measure how well a particular election system reaches the
overall normative goal of democratic governance and selfdetermination. The major problems for election monitoring standards
are their lack of flexibility to adapt to the differing circumstances of
target countries and the danger of false legitimacy from the presence
of observers.
a.

Lack of Flexibility

The key danger of stringent free and fair standards is their lack
of flexibility and adaptability to different and continuously changing
political, historical, and cultural contexts. While such standards may
be helpful for nailing down specific benchmarks by which to judge
elections, the narrowness of the requirements fails to account for vast
differences between nations in terms of cultural backgrounds and
varying stages of democratic development and political history. 151 To
buy into such strict standards creates a level of free and fair that is
impossible for many nations to reach.
Beyond the obvious differences in democratic institutions,
nations differ in their historical and cultural understandings of
government, politics, and citizen participation. Even among the most
developed Western nations, there is no one-size-fits-all formula for
participatory government and electoral systems. 152
It is also
dangerous to overlook the impact on a nation of its history as a
former colony or Soviet satellite, or its religious or cultural history.
The combinations and permutations are nearly infinite. Yet in most

148.
See infra Part IV.B.4.c (discussing the independent role of monitors).
149.
Franck, supra note 3, at 87.
150.
Id.
151.
See generally BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 121 (stating the need to look at
elections in their political context without "lowering the bar" of universal democratic
standards).
152.
Consider, for example, the large differences between the U.S. system and
Parliamentary systems of governance.
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cases, outside individuals, whose ideas are necessarily shaped by
their own different political and cultural backgrounds, create
monitoring standards.
b.

Danger of False Legitimacy

Furthermore, free and fair standards also can create a false
sense of democratic legitimacy. 153 Elections which nominally meet
the definition of free and fair may do nothing to advance the existence
of democracy in the target country if the result is the election of
candidates who are not committed to democratic governance. 154 In
addition, because free and fair standards are often set so high that
many nations are truly unable to reach them, many times the final
judgment of an election is misleading. Results may be termed
"substantially free and fair" or some other variation to that effect. 155
Using such terminology only confuses the issue by casting a false
shade of pseudo-legitimacy on an election outcome, when in truth the
election process did not rise to the level of the proposed standards.
The EU, for example, recognizes the danger of legitimizing a suspect
process and seeks to account for that danger in formulating its
standards and processes of election monitoring. 156 Unfortunately for
the EU, in many cases those good intentions operate to prevent the
EAOD from any type of monitoring activities in particular
circumstances. 157
Furthermore, as this Note has discussed, nearly all monitoring
organizations have some stake in the outcome of the elections they
observe. 158 Thus, the idea that monitoring missions can be truly
neutral and evaluated based on neutral standards is somewhat
misguided. A truly effective framework must take into account the
danger of bias and neutralize it as much as possible so as to obtain
results more accurately termed "legitimate."
c.

Monitors as a Recognized, Independent Entity

The known presence of monitors is a force unto itself in
pressuring the outcome of the target election to be free and
legitimate. 159 Election observers, by their nature, do more than

153.

See BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 97.

154.

Corchado, supra note 110, at 1046.

155.

HANF ET AL., supra note 1, at 17.

156.
Communication, supra note 76, at 5.
157.
See supra Parts H.A, B.5 (discussing EU and U.N. monitoring decisions).
158.
See supra Part II.B (discussing the stake of regional organizations in
monitoring elections).
159.
See Eric Brahm, Election Monitoring, Sept. 2004, available at http://www.
beyondintractability.orgessay/election -monitoring/.
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simply stand by and passively observe a process external to them.
The very presence of outsiders who, by active observation at the very
least, are invested in the election process lends another level of
legitimacy to each election.160 jt is at least partially for this reason
that a number of international organizations refuse to enter and1
16
observe elections unless certain very basic preconditions are met.
Such organizations are concerned about lending an air of legitimacy
to a process that they believe cannot possibly come close to producing
162
legitimate results.
Election missions that take a more active role in all steps of the
election process further demonstrate the impact of this presence. As
a number of monitoring organizations move to a more comprehensive
monitoring approach, it becomes even more important to defer to
their unique role in the process. Every level of involvement should be
recognized as important enough to require denying assistance if truly
comprehensive aid cannot be successful due to time or other
163
constraints.
However, since an end goal is to obtain democratic and selfdetermining societies, the legitimacy gained from effective monitoring
missions is greatly needed.
Monitoring organizations can be
extremely helpful in signaling to the international community that
the target nation is at least somewhat democratic, 16 4 which may
change the treatment of that nation in the global community.

V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: A MONITORING SYSTEM THAT

ATTAINS LEGITIMACY AND GUIDES NATIONS TOWARD
SELF-DETERMINATION

The process of election observation has evolved greatly and now
includes outsiders' presence at all stages of the electoral process and
the involvement of many actors. However, the evolution has yet to
reach the point that the power of election observation can be fully
realized as an effective tool for promoting democratic governance and
peace. The next stage in the evolution of election monitoring should
be a successful integration of efforts of the various organizations.

160.

Id.

161.

See

HANF ET AL, supra note

1,

at 9-11

(discussing the

necessary

preconditions to be analyzed by both the examining mission and the examinee nation).
162.
See supra Parts ILA, B.5 (discussing U.N. and EU monitoring decisions).
163.
EVERED, supra note 96, preface (discussing U.N. decisions to turn down in
these instances).
164.
See BJORNLUND, supra note 2, at 148 (discussing when such initial
statements grant an air of legitimacy to the global community and in some cases later
are contradicted by more detailed reports indicating the true nature of the elections
was inefficient and illegitimate).
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Going forth into the twenty-first century, we also must be aware of
the opportunities afforded by available technology.
A. Integrationof Organizations
Various monitoring organizations must integrate and cooperate
to present a united effort in each monitoring program. The idea of
integration and cooperation is not novel in the world of election
observation.
For example, the EU identifies cooperation and
assistance with other groups as an important goal of their missions,
and it and other groups have actually collaborated on various
missions in the past. 16 5 But such cooperation must in the future rise
to a higher level than merely something to be considered by each
individual group in developing their own monitoring strategy. An
integrated and comprehensive effort should be the primary goal of all
organizations as they go forward into each particular election.
This integration must not devolve into a mere delegation of
166
responsibilities instead of a truly coordinated partnership effort.
The key to success in an integrated system will be coordination with
domestic groups, who in many cases are significantly advantaged in
understanding and formulating goals and methods for particular
elections.
Such coordination will require the formulation of comprehensive
budget and contribution agreements. Past coordinated efforts have
resulted in disagreement about funding, allocation of resources and
duties, treatment of monitoring personnel, and visibility of different
actors. 167
Past efforts have also resulted in contradictory
assessments of election outcomes. 168 To address these problems, it is
necessary to integrate all steps of the process, including the
formulation of goals and strategies, the development of on-the-ground
operations, the creation of evaluation standards, the formulation of
final assessments, and the publication of the results.
Given the intricacy and complexity of the electoral process,
cooperation and integration will not be possible by merely holding one
or two preliminary planning meetings. For such a system to be
successful, it must also utilize the latest technological developments.
Technological innovations will be critical to integrated and
cooperative observation efforts. Advancing technology allows for
better communication and sharing of resources, as well as more
efficient and rapid election processes. 169
Given the rapid
development of new technology, it is important to ensure that such

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Communication,supra note 76, at 23.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Glidden, supra note 19, at 366.
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tools are not used to perpetuate the typical problems that plague
developing nations, such as monopolizing or purposefully changing
election results, obscuring transparency, or otherwise being exploited
170
by illegitimate regimes wishing to keep themselves in power.
Technology also provides the means for an integrated monitoring
effort to be successful. For example, Professor Julia Glidden profiles
the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information
Systems (OASIS) project, an international alliance of organizations
and private actors dedicated to developing an effective election
technology system. 171 OASIS proposes developing a common Election
Markup Language (EML) to allow different software and systems to
communicate election data with one another. 172 In addition to
providing an easy way for ballot distribution and for results and
information to be shared between organizations, a common EML
would allow new processes and systems to develop uniformly. 173 The
project intends to allow for "complete interoperability" among
174
computer applications of all types involved in election monitoring.
This would simplify the election process, allow for fuller and more
efficient integration of organizations, aid in clarifying guidelines, and
175
develop trust in the tools and methods of election monitoring.
OASIS or a similar project should significantly advance the
development of an integrated system.
B. An IntegratedSystem Within Franck'sFramework of Analysis
1.

Pedigree

Integration will enhance the pedigree of election monitoring
rules because it incorporates the historical development of the
various organizations and therefore includes the goals and methods
that have developed out of different historical circumstances. Thus, it
broadens the pedigree and thereby the legitimacy of the election
monitoring effort.
2.

Determinacy

On its face, an integrated effort may seem to harm determinacy
because it ensures that standards will change for each particular
election and destabilizes the underlying consistency of each
organization's dedication to its free and fair standards. However,

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
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given the amalgamation of organizations and standards that already
exists, integration will not worsen the determinacy problem. In fact,
integration of organizations will mitigate the problems of differing
standards by encouraging communication and collaboration. The
application of monitoring standards to each particular election will be
more uniform than in the current system where each organization
clings to its own standards. A unified effort will bring about more
uniform standards and methods.
Each organization has a different stake, role, and set of goals for
each election's outcome. 176 Nearly all articulations of the free and
fair standard are unobtainable in a number of circumstances, and
what results from this vast variety of approaches is a number of
determinations that an election was "substantially free and fair" or
"sufficiently reflect[ed] the will of the people."'17" Such statements do
no more than reflect that elections were not entirely up to par with
what is truly free and fair. However, as long as these organizations
continue to judge using their own particular guidelines, without
presenting any universal and coherent message of what needs to be
done for target nations to improve, it will be nearly impossible for
target states to understand and comply with lofty free and fair
standards.
The global election monitoring effort would benefit from the
presentation of a common front in each election that articulates a set
of standards and overreaching goals rather than confuses matters
with a splintered hodgepodge of standards and assistance. Some
monitoring groups have recognized the importance of coordinating a
unified voice and have already begun to focus on it. 178 Coordination
will also ensure that more elections actually receive comprehensive
monitoring teams. Since some organizations demand underlying
conditions or guarantees before agreeing to monitor, and others
179
specifically focus on those elections most in need of assistance,
currently only some organizations are involved in certain elections.
Integration will ensure that all viewpoints are better represented in
the monitoring of each election.
An integrated approach to election monitoring will also help to
neutralize the various biases brought by different monitoring groups.
This Note has examined the differences in monitoring approaches
from the various actors involved, 180 and the proposed solution aims to
combine the strengths of the different groups to capitalize on the

176.

See supra Part III (explaining the various groups involved in election

monitoring).
177.
HANF ET AL, supra note 1, at 17.

178.
Communication, supra note 76, at 7.
179.
See supra Parts ILA, B.5 (discussing EU and U.N. monitoring decisions).
180.
See supra Part II (discussing the various groups involved in election
monitoring).
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different viewpoints, legal bases, and particularized goals of each.
For example, the U.N. and regional organizations may continue to
provide concrete guideposts against which to analyze election
processes and provide outside observers to evaluate election
processes. NGOs may serve as a check on the natural biases of
regional IGOs. Domestic organizations can focus on the need for
democratic legitimacy without a bias toward a particular finding to
legitimize their own existence.
3.

Coherence

Integration aids in coherence of election monitoring standards by
helping to mitigate the dual-edged problems identified as plaguing
the decision to monitor elections in the first place. 181 While currently
some groups refuse to enter without certain baseline guaranteed
freedoms in target nations 182 and others enter and give a false sense
of legitimacy when target nations are incapable of meeting the lofty
free and fair standards, 183 an integrated effort would encourage
communication and collaboration to eliminate the problems caused by
one approach or the other.
Organizations with gate-keeping
standards may aid other organizations and domestic groups with
different approaches and more short-term, attainable goals. In the
long term, the latter types of organizations would, by interaction with
the gate-keeping groups, have more experience and understanding of
the long-term results they seek, and domestic groups could gear their
other day-to-day operations toward attaining those goals.
4.

Adherence

An integrated effort improves adherence, because it addresses
problems of inflexibility and false legitimacy. It is inadvisable to
establish a permanent super-organization for election observation.
The key to an effective, cooperative, and integrated mission is its
flexibility to respond to nations' various stages of development and
differing political and cultural histories. Successful monitoring must
consider that governments operate at different stages of development.
Some organizations already recognize that situations like initial or
post-conflict transitional elections require looser standards. 184 Even
further flexibility is needed, since the varying cultural and historical
stages of different countries pervades nearly all cases and therefore

181.
See supra Part IV.B.4.a-b (discussing the two-sided problem to entrance
requirements).
182.
See, e.g., Inter-American, supra note 1, art. 3; Declaration of Principles,
supra note 1, art. 3; HANF ET AL., supra note 1, at 4; Electoral Assistance, supra note 1.
183.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
184.
See Communication, supra note 76, at 22.
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must be accounted for. The key to success of an integrated effort in
this aspect is to rely on the expertise of domestic organizations to
create effective goals suited to the particular historical and cultural
circumstances of each target nation.
An integrated effort should recognize that delegations of election
monitors serve as independent and influential forces in the outcome
of domestic elections and therefore must be considered as active
participants in establishing democratic governance in target nations.
From which group a particular part of a mission hails should be
irrelevant, because election monitors themselves should be recognized
as an independent and integral part of the process.' 8 5 Presentation of
a unified front of monitors establishes the monitoring effort as an
independent and more objective force. Furthermore, a unified force
provides much more continuity across nations and election cycles,
helping to establish monitors as an identifiable force throughout the
world.
It is important, however, that observers avoid presenting an air
of "outsider" superiority that might have a detrimental effect on their
legitimacy in the eyes of voters. 186 Full inclusion of domestic
organizations in all elections can mitigate this effect in part, so as to
avoid the "outsider" persona as much as possible. 187 Just as a truly
integrated approach will neutralize the biases of various actors, so
should it also neutralize the influence of their origins, cultural
baggage, and preconceptions.
This shift transforms election
monitoring from a segmented bilateral or limited multilateral
operation to one that is truly international in nature, relying on
experiences and opinions from various stages of development and
expertise.
C. PragmaticAdvantages of an IntegratedEffort
For obvious reasons, requiring cooperation and integration will
also help to conserve resources. The efficiency of the overall effort
should improve by each group focusing on those activities it does best.
For example, the EU can focus on its expertise in providing technical
assistance.1 88 Regional IGOs may send observers for the entirety of
the process, from pre-election to final reporting and implementation.
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Such a policy also allows each organization to capitalize on and
dedicate concentration to its own strengths, leaving other aspects of
the process to other groups more equipped to deal with them. For
example, domestic organizations will play an important role in
creating attainable standards for evaluation, while more idealistically
focused groups can ensure that such standards are still meaningful in
terms of the goals of freedom, fairness, and democratic selfgovernance.

VI. CONCLUSION

Democratic legitimacy is central to twenty-first century notions
of national sovereignty. Such legitimacy depends on the holding of
free and fair elections in some meaning of that term. As election
monitoring garners more respect as a fundamental part of obtaining
democratic legitimacy, it is crucial to ensure that election monitoring
is conducted in a way that truly aids the goal of free and fair elections
rather than distracts or even deters from it. This Note has examined
the current state of election monitoring and analyzed the need for an
integrated effort of various monitoring organizations so as to best
attain the goals of election monitoring and move the nations of the
world toward legitimate democratic governance.
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